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Electrification of passenger road transport and household heating features prominently 7 
in current and planned policy frameworks to achieve greenhouse gas emissions 8 
reduction targets. However, since electricity generation involves using fossil fuels, it is 9 
not established where and when the replacement of fossil fuel-based technologies by 10 
electric cars and heat pumps can effectively reduce overall emissions. Could 11 
electrification policy backfire by promoting their diffusion before electricity is 12 
decarbonised? Here, we analyse current and future emissions trade-offs in 59 world 13 
regions with heterogeneous households, by combining forward-looking integrated 14 
assessment model simulations with bottom-up life-cycle assessment. We show that 15 
already under current carbon intensities of electricity generation, electric cars and heat 16 
pumps are less emission-intensive than fossil fuel-based alternatives in 53 world 17 
regions, representing 95% of global transport and heating demand. Even if future end-18 
use electrification is not matched by rapid power sector decarbonisation, it likely 19 
avoids emissions in world regions representing 94% of global demand.  20 
 21 
Policy-makers widely consider electrification a key measure for decarbonizing road transport 22 
and household heating. Combined, they generate 24% of global fuel-combustion emissions 23 
and are the two major sources of direct carbon emissions by households1–5. For passenger 24 
road transport, plug-in battery electric vehicles (‘EVs’) are expected to gradually replace petrol 25 
and diesel vehicles (‘petrol cars’). For heating, heat pumps (‘HPs’) are an alternative for gas, 26 
oil and coal heating systems (‘fossil boilers’). Recent policy examples aimed at such end-use 27 
electrification include announced bans of petrol car sales, financial incentives for EV and HP 28 
purchases, planned phase-outs of gas heating, and the inclusion of HPs into the European 29 
Union’s renewable heating targets1,2,6–8.  30 
 31 
The use of EVs and HPs eliminates fossil fuel use and tailpipe/on-site greenhouse gas 32 
emissions (‘emissions’), but causes emissions from electricity generation. Emission intensities 33 
in the power sector widely differ across the globe and will change over time3. Additionally, 34 
producing and recycling EVs and HPs involves higher emissions than producing petrol cars 35 
and fossil boilers, due to battery production for EVs, and refrigerant liquid use for HPs9,10. The 36 
question thus arises as to where and when the electrification of energy end-use could, under 37 
a failure to decarbonise electricity generation, increase overall emissions11,12.  38 
 39 
Multi-sectoral mitigation scenarios (such as those reviewed by the IPCC) have identified 40 
electrification as a robust policy strategy, but typically focus on a context of rapid power sector 41 
decarbonisation3,13. However, sector-specific policies and self-reinforcing social and industrial 42 
dynamics could as well lead to real-world trajectories in which end-use electrification and 43 
power sector decarbonisation take place at completely different rates14. In such a context, 44 
could end-use electrification turn into a counterproductive policy strategy for reducing 45 
emissions?  46 
 47 
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The answer requires a comprehensive and dynamic life-cycle assessment of all relevant 48 
production and use-phase emissions in different world regions, of current technology in its full 49 
heterogeneity, now and in the future. Time and location-specific differences stem not only from 50 
the power sector fuel mix, but also from individual preferences and decision-making by millions 51 
of people: Which type of fossil fuel technologies are likely to be replaced by which type of EV 52 
or HP? This requires a comparison not only of generic (representative) technology types, but 53 
of technology ranges (market segments), based on empirically observed sales in each region. 54 
 55 
This is different to existing life-cycle studies of EVs and HPs, which are limited to the present 56 
situation, and mostly focus on a few regions or global averages (see refs.15–23 for studies on 57 
EVs, and refs.10,24,25 on HPs). For the case of EVs, only two studies extend the analysis into 58 
the future9,26. However, they do not consider regional differences around the globe, 59 
heterogeneous technology choices by consumers or the electrification of heating, and thus 60 
cannot adequately and comprehensively inform policy-making processes at the national level. 61 
 62 
Our study consistently investigates the full life-cycle emission trade-offs from electric cars and 63 
heat pumps over time in a regionally highly disaggregated way, based on forward-looking 64 
simulations of heterogeneous consumer choices, while explicitly investigating possible 65 
temporal mismatches between end-use electrification and power sector decarbonisation.  66 
 67 
Scenarios of technology diffusion 68 
We simulate future technology diffusion and resulting emissions in power generation, 69 
passenger road transport and household heating for 59 regions covering the world 70 
(Supplementary Table 1), using the integrated assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE27,28. This 71 
model’s representation of technology uptake in transport and heating is strongly empirical, 72 
based on detailed regional datasets on consumer markets, and simulates technology diffusion 73 
profiles consistent with historical observations (see Methods)29–31. We combine scenario 74 
projections with bottom-up estimates of life-cycle emissions from producing different 75 
technologies and their fuels9,10, in order to analyse emissions trade-offs and net changes from 76 
end-use electrification under three scenarios:  77 
 78 
(i) A scenario projecting existing observed technological trajectories into the future (‘current 79 
technological trajectory’),  80 
(ii) A scenario of detailed sectoral climate policies with 75% probability of achieving the 2°C 81 
climate target (‘2°C scenario’), and  82 
(iii) A scenario of mismatched policies (‘end-use without power policies’), in which climate 83 
policies are only applied to transport and heating.  84 
 85 
Fig. 1 shows the simulated future diffusion of electricity-generation technologies in the power 86 
sector, passenger cars in the road transport sector, and heating technologies in the household 87 
sector, building on previous detailed modelling studies27,28,30–32.   88 
 89 
Under the ‘current technology trajectory’, future technology uptake is assumed to follow 90 
current technological diffusion trajectories in each sector, as can be observed in market data 91 
(such as the diffusion of renewables, a shift towards more efficient petrol cars and an 92 
increasing uptake of EVs and HPs). We model the underlying decision-making by investors 93 
and consumers until 2050, using a simulation-based algorithm (Methods). The scenario 94 
includes existing policies (such as the EU-ETS), but excludes policies that are not 95 
implemented yet (such as announced phase-outs of petrol cars). The model does not optimise 96 
the technological configuration, and therefore does not prevent end-use electrification where 97 
it would lead to emission increases or higher overall system costs. 98 
 99 
In the ‘2°C scenario’, we impose bundles of additional policies on all three sectors from 2020 100 
onwards27,28,30–32 (Methods). The policies were chosen based on what has already been 101 
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implemented in at least some countries, and could therefore also be politically feasible in other 102 
countries. This includes carbon pricing and feed-in-tariffs for power generation, along with fuel 103 
taxes and technology-specific subsidies for transport and heating. The policy mixes induce 104 
demand reductions and a more rapid uptake of low-carbon technologies, compared to the 105 
‘current trajectory’ – not only of EVs and HPs, but also of higher-efficiency petrol cars and 106 
heating systems.  107 
 108 
In the ‘end-use without power policies’ scenario, we apply the full set of climate policies from 109 
the ‘2°C scenario’ to transport and heating, but not to the power and other sectors, which are 110 
assumed to follow their ‘current technological trajectory’. While such a combination of policies 111 
is perhaps unlikely in reality, the scenario’s purpose is a worst-case analysis: What impact 112 
would an increased uptake of EVs and HPs have on overall emissions, if the carbon intensity 113 
of electricity generation worldwide follows its current trajectory? 114 
 115 
Under the ‘current technological trajectory’, the global mean emission intensity of electricity 116 
generation (direct plus indirect emissions per kWh) is projected to decrease 10% by 2030 and 117 
16% by 2050 (relative to a 2015 average of 740 gCO2eq/kWh), with considerable variation 118 
between countries (Supplementary Table 2). EVs are projected in the current trajectory to 119 
account for 19% of global passenger road transport in 2050 (1% in 2030), and HPs for 16% 120 
of global residential heat demand (7% in 2030)28, also with considerable variation between 121 
regions (Supplementary Tables 3 and 4). In the ‘2°C scenario’, the power sector’s carbon 122 
intensity decreases 44% by 2030, and 74% by 2050 (relative to 2015). The policies will take 123 
some time to change the technology mix in transport and heating, but they eventually increase 124 
the market share of EVs to 50% by 2050 (1% in 2030), and of HPs to 35% by 2050 (12% in 125 
2030).  126 
 127 
Current emission intensities in transport and heating  128 
Fig. 2 presents the global conditions under which life-cycle emission intensities from driving 129 
EVs and heating with HPs are lower than those of new petrol cars and fossil boilers. Fig. 3 130 
and Fig. 4 illustrate this comparison in more detail for the ten countries with the largest 131 
passenger road transport and residential heating demand, for all three scenarios, both under 132 
current conditions and in the future. Fig. 5 gives a global overview over where and when 133 
electrification would reduce emissions. All estimates include production and end-of-life-134 
emissions (of cars, batteries and heating systems), upstream emissions from the extraction 135 
and processing of fossil fuels, and the equivalent indirect emissions from electricity generation 136 
(Methods). 137 
 138 
For EVs, the range of emission intensities reflects higher and lower energy use of different 139 
electric car models and sizes which are currently available in the market. The central estimates 140 
within different regions refer to an average efficiency model with an energy use of 19 kWh 141 
electricity per 100 vehicle-kilometre in 2015, subject to future improvements (17 kWh/100km 142 
in 2030, and 14 kWh/100km in 2050)9 (Methods). For petrol cars, the distribution of intensities 143 
refers to empirically measured and projected sales of all petrol and diesel cars (incl. non-plug-144 
in hybrids) in the respective year and country, according to market data and projections by 145 
E3ME-FTT29,30 (Methods). For HPs, the range of emission intensities reflects higher and lower 146 
conversion efficiencies (ratio of heat output to electricity input) of different HP models and 147 
under different operating conditions. The central estimates in each respective region 148 
correspond to an average efficiency system with a realised conversion efficiency of 300% in 149 
2015 (390% in 2030, and 420% in 2050)33. For fossil boilers, distributions indicate the 150 
intensities of newly sold heating systems within a given year and region (oil, gas and coal), 151 
also based on empirical data and model projections31.  152 
 153 
From a global perspective, given current conversion efficiencies and production processes, 154 
we find that in 2015 driving an average EV had a lower life-cycle emission intensity than 155 
average new petrol cars if the electricity grid’s emission intensity was below 1100 156 
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gCO2eq/kWh (weighted by regional service demand) (Fig. 2a). For heating, average HPs had 157 
a lower life-cycle emission intensity than average new fossil boilers if the grid’s emission 158 
intensity did not exceed 1000 gCO2eq/kWh (Fig. 2b). This roughly corresponds to the emission 159 
intensity of older coal power plants34, and is higher than the estimated life-cycle emission 160 
intensity of more than 90% of global electricity generation in 2015 (Supplementary Table 2).  161 
 162 
On global average, even very inefficient EVs and HPs would be less emission intensive than 163 
very efficient new petrol cars and fossil boilers if the grid’s emission intensity was below 700 164 
gCO2eq/kWh (in case of EVs) and 500 gCO2eq/kWh (in case of HPs), respectively (Fig. 2). 165 
These thresholds roughly correspond to the emission intensity of gas power plants34, and are 166 
lower than the average emission intensity of global electricity generation in 2015 (around 740 167 
gCO2eq/kWh, Supplementary Table 2). The general finding that EVs and HPs have lower life-168 
cycle emissions than most petrol cars and fossil boilers is robust against variations in uncertain 169 
production emissions, such as uncertain embodied emissions from producing batteries of 170 
EVs9,35 and higher-than-expected leakage of refrigerant liquids during all life-cycle phases of 171 
HPs10 (Supplementary Figures 5 and 6).  172 
 173 
Importantly for policy-making on the national level, region-specific threshold emission 174 
intensities can be lower or higher than the global averages, depending on the region-specific 175 
mix of new petrol cars and fossil boilers that would be replaced. For road transport, the current 176 
thresholds below which average-efficiency EVs would result in lower net emissions than 177 
average new petrol cars are between 700 gCO2eq/kWh (in Brazil) and 1500 gCO2eq/kWh (in 178 
the USA and Canada) (Fig. 3), depending on the region-specific mix of new petrol cars. Very 179 
inefficient EVs would still be less emission intensive than very efficient new petrol cars (‘green’ 180 
cases), if the electricity grid’s emission intensity was below between 300 gCO2eq/kWh (in 181 
Japan) and 1000 gCO2eq/kWh (in Canada). For heating, the current threshold emission 182 
intensity for average HPs is between 800 gCO2eq/kWh (in Sweden and the Netherlands) and 183 
1400 gCO2eq/kWh (in Poland and South Africa), depending on the region-specific mix of fossil 184 
boilers that HPs could replace (Fig. 4). Very inefficient HPs would still have lower emission 185 
intensities than very efficient fossil boilers when the grid’s carbon intensity was below around 186 
450 gCO2eq/kWh.  187 
 188 
Accordingly, we find that current models of EVs and HPs have lower life-cycle emission 189 
intensities than current new petrol cars and fossil boilers  in 53 of 59 world regions, accounting 190 
for 95% of global road transport demand and 96% of global heat demand in 2015 191 
(Supplementary Fig. 1). Relative differences range from EVs being around 70% less emission 192 
intensive per vehicle-kilometre (in largely renewable- and nuclear-powered Iceland, 193 
Switzerland and Sweden), to being 40% more emission intensive (in oil shale-dependent 194 
Estonia) (Supplementary Table 6). For HPs, relative differences in life-cycle emissions per 195 
kWh of useful heat are between -88% (Switzerland) and +120% (Estonia). On global average 196 
in 2015, EVs result in 31% lower emissions per vehicle-kilometre compared to petrol cars 197 
(each region weighted by its transport demand), and the emission intensity of HPs is on 198 
average 35% lower than that of fossil boilers (regions weighted by their heat demand)  199 
(Supplementary Table 6).  200 
 201 
While EVs and HPs generally cause less emissions than fossil-fuel based technologies in 202 
most of the world, this may not always be true when comparing specific pairs of technologies. 203 
Markets are highly diverse, due to varying preferences, incomes, household characteristics, 204 
and attraction to energy-intense luxury items29. In many regions, this empirical diversity results 205 
in significant overlap between the observed emission intensity distributions of petrol cars and 206 
fossil boilers on one side, and the likely emission intensity ranges of available EVs and HPs 207 
on the other side. Efficient new petrol cars can cause less emissions than average EVs, and 208 
efficient new gas boilers can outperform average HPs (indicated in yellow in Fig. 3-5). In 2015, 209 
this happens in regions accounting for 43% of global demand in road transport (23 regions), 210 




Region-wide emission increases are only likely where the average emission intensity of EVs 213 
or HPs is higher than for the majority of new petrol cars or fossil boilers (indicated in red in 214 
Fig. 3-5). As of 2015, this applies to 5% of global road transport demand (5 regions) and 4% 215 
of global heating demand (6 regions) (Fig. 5). In the most favourable case (indicated in green), 216 
even very inefficient electrification (equivalent to the upper end of their ranges) is less emission 217 
intensive than using the most efficient new petrol cars or fossil boilers instead (equivalent to 218 
the lower bounds of their respective distributions). EVs or HPs can then reduce net emissions 219 
in almost all situations. This is the case in regions accounting for 52% of global demand for 220 
passenger road transport (31 regions), and in regions with 16% of global demand for 221 
household heating (25 regions).  222 
 223 
Future emission intensities in transport and heating 224 
Since technology continuously evolves in any policy regime, the emissions trade-offs change 225 
over time (Supplementary Figures 2 and 3). Under the ‘current technological trajectory’, in 226 
many regions an ongoing reduction in the power sector’s emissions intensity gradually 227 
decreases indirect emission intensities of using EVs and HPs (also the electricity-related 228 
emissions from producing them). In addition, technological progress gradually improves their 229 
energy efficiency (Methods). Due to a combination of both effects, mean emission intensities 230 
of EVs are projected to be around 20% lower in 2030 (relative to 2015), and 30% lower in 231 
2050 (weighted by transport demand in 2015). Mean intensities of HPs are projected to 232 
decrease 30% below their 2015 value by 2030, and 40% by 2050 (weighted by heat demand 233 
in 2015).  234 
 235 
Meanwhile, in most regions more efficient variants of fossil-fuel based technologies will 236 
increase their market shares, such as hybrid cars or condensing gas boilers, reducing the 237 
emission abatement potential from electrification (Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). Averaged 238 
over all regions, new petrol cars in 2050 will emit 20% less emissions per vehicle-kilometre 239 
than in 2015, and new fossil boiler will be 15% less emissions intensive (weighted by service 240 
demand in 2015), with large variations between regions. The largest changes are projected 241 
for countries where petrol cars or boilers are currently still relatively inefficient. For example, 242 
based on current trends, we project that the 2050 emission intensities of new petrol cars in 243 
the USA and new fossil boilers in China will be around 30% below their 2015 levels.  244 
 245 
In 2030, under the ‘current technological trajectory’ and the ‘end-use without power policies’ 246 
scenarios, resulting average emission intensities of EVs and HPs do not exceed those of 247 
fossil-fuel based alternatives in any of the ten countries with the highest transport and heating 248 
demand, even without additional decarbonisation policies in the power sector (Fig. 3 and Fig. 249 
4). The only exception is road transport in Japan: Due to the unique combination of very 250 
efficient petrol cars (with a growing share of hybrids) and a power sector that is not highly 251 
decarbonised, EVs could lead to marginally higher emissions (Supplementary Table 6). By 252 
2045 and 2035, respectively, EVs and HPs in the current trajectory are on average less 253 
emission intensive than fossil alternatives in all world regions (Supplementary Figure 1). This 254 
means that electrification will reduce region-wide emissions as a whole, which is most relevant 255 
for policy-making. Note, however, that the diversity of technology choices implies that in some 256 
regions (indicated in yellow in Fig. 3-5), some consumers may still buy EVs or HPs which 257 
cause higher emissions than efficient new petrol cars or gas boilers. Meanwhile, in the ‘green’ 258 
regions, electrification will reduce emissions in almost any conceivable case. 259 
 260 
Possible overlaps between technology categories are much rarer in the ‘2°C scenario’, with 261 
its much faster power sector decarbonisation. In all world regions, EVs and HPs are on 262 
average less emission intensive than fossil-fuel alternatives from around 2025 onwards (Fig. 263 
5 c-d). This is despite increased average efficiencies of new petrol cars and fossil boilers, 264 
relative to the ‘current technological trajectory’ (Supplementary Table 7). By 2030, even 265 
inefficient EVs or HPs have lower emission intensities than very efficient new fossil-based 266 
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alternatives in regions accounting for around 90% of global transport and heat demand, 267 
respectively. This implies that in the medium term, in almost all cases the more effective policy 268 
strategy for reducing transport and heating emissions is to push EVs and HPs, instead of 269 
supporting the uptake of more efficient fossil-fuel-based technologies. 270 
 271 
In the ‘end-use without power policies’ scenario, future intensities follow the ‘2°C  policy’ trend 272 
for petrol cars and fossil boilers, but remain identical to the ‘current trajectory’ for EVs and HPs 273 
(Supplementary Table 8). Between 2020 and 2050, there is thus a relatively larger share of 274 
global demand for which future emission intensities will partially overlap in both transport and 275 
heating (‘yellow regions’), compared to the ‘current trajectory’. Although this reduces the 276 
potential magnitude of net emission reductions from electrification relative to the ‘2°C  277 
scenario’, the risk of region-wide emission increases (‘red regions’) remains limited: The share 278 
of transport and heat demand for which EVs and HPs would increase average emissions 279 
compared to the use of their fossil counterparts never exceeds 6%. 280 
 281 
Net changes in total emissions  282 
Finally, we project how EVs and HPs could change future levels of economy-wide emissions 283 
over time, compared to fossil fuel-based technologies. For each region, we estimate the 284 
emissions from using and producing EVs and HPs in each year, and subtract avoided 285 
emissions from the alternative use and production of new petrol cars and fossil boilers 286 
(Methods). We find that both EVs and HPs reduce global emissions in all scenarios and at all 287 
times (Fig. 6): EVs by up to -1.5 GtCO2/y (-29% of total passenger road transport emissions 288 
without use of EVs), and HPs by up to -0.8 GtCO2/y (-46% of total residential heating 289 
emissions without use of HPs).  290 
 291 
As EVs and HPs replace fossil-based technologies over time, production emissions are 292 
projected to grow from around 25% of total road transport emissions in 2015 to 35-38% in 293 
2050, and from 1% of total heating emissions in 2015 to 2-9% in 2050 (Supplementary Figure 294 
4). This is due to (i) reduced use-phase emissions from electricity and (ii) increased production 295 
emissions, which are currently around 30% higher for EVs than for petrol cars (at the average 296 
global electricity mix), and fifteen times higher for HPs than for fossil boilers (mainly from the 297 
leakage of refrigerant liquid). A full decarbonisation of household energy use therefore 298 
remains infeasible without also reducing the embodied emissions from producing and 299 
recycling technologies and required materials (such as steel), beyond the decarbonisation of 300 
the electricity input. 301 
 302 
Due to the delay between (relatively higher) production emissions and (relatively lower) use-303 
phase emissions, a rapid technological transition towards EVs and HPs could temporarily 304 
increase emission in individual regions, compared to the production and use of fossil-fuel 305 
based technologies – even if EVs and HPs cause lower emission over their whole life-cycle36. 306 
However, we find that in all three scenarios, temporary emission increases from EV and HP 307 
production are limited to regions accounting for less than 7% of global transport and 4% of 308 
global heat demand (Supplementary Table 9). In almost all regions, such temporary increases 309 
are outweighed by emission reductions in subsequent years. Even in the ‘end-use without 310 
power policies’ scenario, EVs and HPs would therefore reduce cumulative emissions from 311 
2015-2050 in regions accounting for 96% of road transport and 97% of heating demand.  312 
 313 
Discussion 314 
Overall, we find that current and future life-cycle emissions from EVs and HPs are on average 315 
lower than those of new petrol cars and fossil boilers - not just on the global aggregate, but 316 
also in most individual countries. Over time, in more and more regions even the use of 317 
inefficient EVs or HPs is less emission intensive than the most efficient new petrol cars or 318 




Importantly for policy-making on the national level, given that the alignment of policy-making 321 
across departments is highly complex and not necessarily always successful37–39, we showed 322 
that the risk of implementing incoherent decarbonisation policies is low in the case of EVs and 323 
HPs. Even if future end-use electrification is not matched by rapid power sector 324 
decarbonisation, the use of EVs and HPs almost certainly avoids emissions in most world 325 
regions, compared to fossil-fuel based alternatives.  326 
 327 
Our analysis disaggregates global demand into 59 world regions, a spatial resolution which is 328 
considerably higher than in any previous forward-looking life-cycle study of EVs or HPs. 329 
Further research could focus on the remaining variation within larger simulated world regions 330 
(such as China20, the USA17,21). Such studies could also analyse the location-specific impacts 331 
of integrating EVs and HPs into the electricity grid40–43, and how this translates into varying 332 
marginal emission intensities over time (compared to the average emission intensities used in 333 
this study)43,44.  334 
 335 
Finally, our findings imply (i) that support for high efficiency fossil-fuel technologies may only 336 
be justified in the short term, when the market uptake of EVs and HPs can still be constrained 337 
by limited production capacities and necessary infrastructure adjustments, and (ii) that policy-338 
makers in most parts of the world can go ahead with ambitious end-use electrification policies, 339 
without the need to rely on further power sector decarbonisation, while (iii) achievable 340 
emission reductions in transport are partly constrained by remaining production emissions.  341 
 342 
 343 
Methods  344 
 345 
Greenhouse gas emission intensities. For estimating current and future emission intensities 346 
of electricity generation, passenger road transport and household heating, we combined 347 
estimates from the life-cycle assessment literature with model projections of future technology 348 
uptake and resulting emission intensities28,32, inspired by the work in Refs.45–49. For both the 349 
use and the production of technologies, we explicitly included the projected emission changes 350 
which result from the changing mix of electricity generation technologies over time. For all 351 
technologies, we included all production and end-of-life emissions. These were equally 352 
distributed over the entire life-span for the calculation of emission intensities (Fig. 2-5), and 353 
allocated to the respective years of production and disposal for the estimation of absolute 354 
emission levels over time (Fig. 6).  Note that we evaluated the emission intensities of 355 
technologies, rather than households (which in some cases may use a combination of 356 
technologies).  357 
 358 
Electricity generation. We based all calculations on the region-wide average grid emission 359 
intensities of electricity generation (gCO2eq/kWh), which we calculated from the model-360 
projected levels of total power sector emissions and electricity demand in each region and 361 
year. As we divide total GHG emissions by total electricity demand (instead of generation), 362 
the resulting intensity values include transmission and distribution losses. Historic data (up to 363 
2012) was based on IEA, while relative future changes of these historic values were projected 364 
by E3ME-FTT. We included indirect emissions from the extraction and processing of fossil 365 
fuels, the construction of power generation technologies (including necessary infrastructure 366 
and supply chain emissions), and methane emissions (all based on the ‘most likely estimates’ 367 
from IPCC-AR534), as well as indirect emissions from biomass use50. The resulting life-cycle 368 
emission intensities per year and region are given in Supplementary Table 2. 369 
 370 
Electric cars (EVs). For all cars, we subdivided GHG emissions into use-phase emissions 371 
(from driving the car), and production and end-of-life emissions. We calculated use-phase 372 
emissions as the product of the car’s electricity use and the emission intensity of electricity 373 
generation in each region (as described above). Ranges of current and future electricity use 374 
per vehicle-kilometre were based on estimates by Cox et al.51 for 2015 (median: 0.19 kWh/v-375 
8 
 
km; 5th-95th percentile range: 0.13-0.24 kWh/v-km) and 2040 (median: 0.15 kWh/v-km; 5th-95th 376 
percentile range: 0.10-0.19 kWh/v-km, based on the ‘most likely automation’ scenario), 377 
including auxiliary power demand and charging losses. These values were based on a review 378 
of currently available EVs, and calibrated to match empirical energy use under real-world 379 
driving conditions. We linearly interpolated the efficiency ranges between 2015-2040, and 380 
linearly extrapolated this trend to 2050. Relative improvements compared to 2015 equal 381 
around -12% until 2030, and -24% until 2050.  382 
 383 
Production and end-of-life emissions were further subdivided into emissions from electricity 384 
required for the production process, and non-electricity emissions. Electricity requirements 385 
(excluding the battery) were obtained from EcoInvent52 (version 3.5), adding up the electricity 386 
inputs of the foreground process (production of the car) and of all background processes 387 
(production of parts and materials, transport, mining, etc.) (see Supplementary Section 4). We 388 
determined electricity emissions by multiplying the amount of required electricity with the 389 
projected GHG-intensity of electricity generation in the country where the car is driven, thereby 390 
abstracting from the import and export of cars (and car parts). For the production of medium-391 
sized EVs (curb weight of 1,500 kg), electricity requirements (excluding the battery) were 392 
estimated at 6,900 kWh (0.046 kWh/v-km, assuming an average lifetime of 150,000 v-km)52. 393 
Emissions from other sources in the car production (excl. the battery) were set at 4,700 394 
kgCO2eq (31 gCO2eq/v-km)52. For the battery production, non-electricity emissions were 395 
estimated at 3,200 kgCO2eq (21.3 gCO2eq/v-km), and battery cell electricity requirements at 396 
5,000 kWh (0.034 kWh/v-km)51. The latter was estimated to linearly decrease to 3,400 kWh 397 
(0.023 kWh/v-km) in 204051, and we further linearly extrapolated this trend to 2050. As 398 
electricity requirements and embodied emissions of the production processes can be subject 399 
to uncertainty, we included a sensitivity analysis for a range of life-cycle parameters 400 
(Supplementary Figures 5 and 6).  401 
 402 
Petrol cars. For use-phase emissions, we first calculated ‘tank-to-wheel’ emissions of cars 403 
based on the distributions of manufacturer-rated intensities (without any blend of biofuels) of 404 
all liquid-fuel cars (petrol and diesel, including non-plug-in hybrids) which are sold in a given 405 
region and year – based on empirical data at the start of the simulation, and projected into the 406 
future by E3M3-FTT. Real-world fuel use and resulting use-phase CO2 emissions of petrol 407 
cars are widely recognized to exceed official manufacturer ratings, by an average margin of 408 
10-40% (based on empirical studies in Europe, the USA and China)53–57. We therefore 409 
adjusted all manufacturer ratings by the central estimate of 25%, consistent with the 410 
adjustment calculations by the US Environmental Protection Agency57. For obtaining ‘well-to-411 
wheel’ emissions, we added upstream emissions from the extraction and processing of fuels 412 
(26% of ‘tank-to-wheel’ emissions for petrol, and 28% for diesel)58–60. Emissions from car 413 
production and end-of-life were sub-divided into emissions from electricity required for the 414 
production process (including background processes), and non-electricity emissions. 415 
Electricity requirements for producing a medium-sized car (curb weight 1,600 kg) were 416 
estimated at 9,200 kWh (0.061 kWh/v-km), and emissions from other sources at 5,900 417 
kgCO2eq (40 gCO2eq./v-km)52. 418 
 419 
Heat pumps (HPs). We differentiated between use-phase emissions (from heating), and 420 
production and end-of-life emissions. We calculated use-phase emissions as the product of 421 
HP point-of-use conversion efficiencies (i.e. the ratio of heat delivered to the electricity 422 
consumed over the season), and the region-specific intensities in electricity generation. The 423 
average efficiency was set to 300% in 2015 (range: 200%-600%), based on the IEA-ETSAP 424 
expert ranges given for the most common types of HPs (air-to-air, air-to-water, ground-425 
source)33. The same literature source estimated that future efficiencies of HPs will improve by 426 
30-50% until 2030, and 40-60% until 2050. As HPs are a relatively mature technology, we 427 
based our calculations on the lower bound estimates (30% efficiency improvement until 2030, 428 
40% until 2050). We linearly interpolated between 2015-2050, yielding average efficiencies of 429 




For the production and end-of-life stage of HPs, we estimated emissions from non-electricity 432 
sources at 830 kg CO2eq per kW of installed capacity52. 750 kg CO2eq of these emissions 433 
stem from the leakage of refrigerant liquids over the entire life-cycle,  all included here in the 434 
production emissions. We converted the impacts into the functional unit of gCO2eq/kWhth, 435 
assuming an average technical lifetime of 20 years61 with 2,000 operating hours per year62, 436 
yielding non-electricity emissions of 20.8 gCO2eq/kWhth (incl. leakage). Electricity 437 
requirements for the production of HPs (including background processes) were set at 65 kWh 438 
per kW of installed capacity (0.002 kWh/kWhth)52. 439 
 440 
Fossil-fuel heating systems. We based our calculation of use-phase emissions on the 441 
distribution of intensities of all decentral residential fossil-fuel based heating systems (oil, gas 442 
and coal) being sold in a respective region and year, simulated until 2050 by E3ME-FTT (see 443 
section ‘Distributions of petrol cars and fossil boilers’). We assumed conversion efficiencies of 444 
75% for oil and gas heating systems, 86% for advanced oil systems, and 90% for advanced 445 
gas systems63. We combined these with IPCC emission factors to obtain emission intensities 446 
per technology. We added upstream emissions from the extraction and processing of heating 447 
oil (equivalent to 28% of direct emissions, based on the estimate for diesel58, which is 448 
chemically near-equivalent to heating oil), gas (23% of direct emissions64), and coal (6% of 449 
direct emissions65). For the production, we based our calculations on EcoInvent (v3.5) 450 
estimates for gas and oil boilers52, which constitute the large majority of global sales. Electricity 451 
requirements (including background processes) are 37 kWh per kW of installed capacity 452 
(0.001 kWh/kWhth, based on the same lifetimes and operating hours as for HPs), and 453 
emissions of other sources are  30 kg CO2eq per kW (0.8 gCO2eq/kWhth)52.  454 
 455 
Distributions of petrol cars and fossil boilers. We estimated the ranges of emission 456 
intensities from empirically measured and projected sales in the respective year and country 457 
(Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). For cars, the distribution of current sales was derived from 458 
detailed market data on vehicle sales (years 2004-2012), which we compiled by matching 459 
sales data to manufacturer data for thousands of individual vehicle models currently on the 460 
market in 18 countries, and we extrapolated these values for countries where data is 461 
missing29,30. Distributions of future sales (2013-2050) were projected by E3ME-FTT (section 462 
‘Integrated assessment model’), based on the market data and simulated future consumer 463 
choices. For some regions (mainly in Africa, Supplementary Table 1), vehicle sales were 464 
assumed to equal global averages, due to the unavailability of empirical data. For heating 465 
systems, current and future sales were simulated by E3ME-FTT (from 2015-2050), according 466 
to available data on fuel use and technology stocks (years 1990-2014)31,66. Both for cars and 467 
boilers, we then calculated the mean and standard deviation of emission intensities (incl. 468 
upstream emissions) of all sales in a respective region, for each year until 2050, according to 469 
our simulations (Supplementary Tables 6-8). The intensity of each technology type was 470 
thereby weighted by the number of model-projected sales in each world region. Emissions 471 
from the production of technologies were added as a constant. This way, future changes in 472 
the range of emission intensities are not an exogenous input, but endogenously projected by 473 
the model, based on a gradually changing technology composition in the context of different 474 
policy assumptions.  475 
 476 
Net changes in GHG emissions. We estimated net changes in overall emissions for each 477 
world region in each year. First, we calculated the emissions from EVs and HPs, based on 478 
their model-projected region-specific market shares and average use-phase emission 479 
intensities (section ‘Scenarios of technology uptake’). Emissions from the production phase 480 
were fully allocated to the year in which a car or heating system is produced, and end-of-life 481 
emissions to the year of its disposal (assuming average lifetimes of 10 years for cars and 20 482 
years for heating systems) (see Supplementary Section 5 for the relative shares). Second, we 483 
subtracted avoided emissions which otherwise would have been emitted by new petrol cars 484 
or fossil boilers, if they would have been used to fulfil the same service demand, also based 485 
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on the projected average intensities of sales in each region (without blend of biofuels). The 486 
use of region-specific intensities results in relatively smaller/larger net savings in regions 487 
where the average efficiency of new petrol cars/fossil boilers is relatively higher/lower. Results 488 
depend on the assumed reference point: While many combinations are possible, what matters 489 
for region-wide effects is the sum over all individual choices of cars and heating systems within 490 
one region in any given year. While the mean efficiencies in each region can change over 491 
time, we assumed that the structure of all sales remains distributed, i.e. that people would not 492 
suddenly all buy economic small engine cars. Cumulative net changes can then be 493 
approximated based on the region-specific means of distributed intensities. Global changes 494 
in emissions equal the sum of all region-specific estimates.  495 
 496 
Scenarios of technology uptake. We used E3ME-FTT model projections of future 497 
technology diffusion and fuel use in three scenarios: (i) ‘Current technological trajectory’, (ii) 498 
‘2°C policy scenario’, (iii) ‘end-use without power policies’. These scenarios were chosen so 499 
that they allowed to simulate the emission trade-offs from electrification as realistically as 500 
possible, given (i) what is likely from a current perspective, (ii) what would be likely in a 501 
(hypothetical) case of ambitious climate policies around the globe, and (iii) a worst-case 502 
scenario in which end-use electrification is not matched by power sector decarbonisation. The 503 
first two scenarios were based on recent modelling studies27,28,32, and detailed descriptions of 504 
the underlying policy assumptions are available in ref.28. All policies included in the scenarios 505 
are designed to match as closely as possible real-world policy instruments, for example 506 
energy taxes, vehicle taxes, feed-in tariffs, subsidies, direct regulation or efficiency standards. 507 
 508 
(i) ‘Current technological trajectory’. As a result of the path-dependent simulation nature of 509 
E3ME-FTT, the model projects a baseline trajectory in which technological change already 510 
takes place without the implementation of additional policies. To differentiate from baselines 511 
without any technological change, we refer to it as the ‘current technological trajectory’, in 512 
which several low-carbon technologies (such as solar photovoltaics, EVs or HPs) already 513 
diffuse to some extent, following the trajectory observed in historical data, while other 514 
technology types (such as low-efficiency petrol cars, coal and oil heating systems) are 515 
projected to decline in market shares, also observed in data. The scenario implicitly includes 516 
current policies in the transport and heating sectors, given that they already had a measurable 517 
impact on empirically observed technology uptake in our historic data sets. For the heating 518 
sector, we furthermore assumed that the average insulation efficiency of buildings gradually 519 
increases over time (see Supplementary Section 4). For the power sector, we explicitly 520 
included existing policy schemes, such as the EU-ETS.  521 
 522 
(ii) ‘2°C policy scenario’. We imposed sets of sector-specific policies to achieve a projected 523 
trajectory of global emissions which is consistent with a 75% probability of not exceeding 2 °C 524 
global warming by the end of the century. Policies are implemented in or after 2020. In 525 
electricity generation, transport and heating, they are defined so that they either incentivise 526 
the uptake of low-carbon technologies (e.g. subsidies or feed-in tariffs), disincentivise the use 527 
of fossil fuels (e.g. carbon taxes), or regulate the use of fossil fuel technologies (such as 528 
efficiency standards or a phase-out of coal power plants). In electricity generation, the main 529 
policies are (i) carbon pricing; (ii) subsidies for renewables and nuclear; (iii) feed-in tariffs (for 530 
wind and solar); (iv) a ban on the construction of new coal power plants; and (v) increased 531 
capacities for electricity storage. In passenger road transport, the main policies are (i) fuel 532 
efficiency standards for newly sold petrol cars; (ii) a gradual phase-out of older low-efficiency 533 
petrol cars; (iii) a gradually increasing fuel tax; (iv) a purchase tax for vehicles proportional to 534 
their rated emission intensity; (v) procurement programmes for EVs where they are not 535 
available yet; (vi) an increasing biofuel mandate (reaching up to 10%-30% in 2050, region-536 
specific mandates extrapolate IEA projections). In household heating, the main policies are (i) 537 
a tax on the residential use of fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal); (ii) subsidies on the upfront 538 
purchase costs of renewable heating technologies (HPs, solar thermal and modern biomass), 539 
which start in 2020 and are linearly phased out after 2030; and (iii) more stringent building 540 
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regulations, implying that a large fraction of houses are retrofitted to passive house properties. 541 
More details can be obtained in Refs.27,28. 542 
 543 
(iii) ‘End-use without power policies’. We combined the power sector trajectory from scenario 544 
(i) with the road transport and heating trajectories from (ii), making the scenario assumption 545 
that policy makers would implement policies to push EVs and HPs while not pursuing any 546 
further decarbonisation of electricity generation. No policies were imposed on any other 547 
sectors. Although such a combination of policies is unlikely in the real world, the scenario 548 
serves as a worst case analysis. 549 
 550 
Integrated assessment model. E3ME-FTT-GENIE is a simulation-based integrated 551 
assessment model which combines bottom-up representations of the power, transport and 552 
heating sectors with a macro-econometric representation of the global economy, for 59 553 
regions covering the globe (Supplementary Table 1)27. 554 
 555 
FTT models. The FTT (Future Technology Transformation) family of models project the uptake 556 
of energy technologies in the future until 2050, by extending the current trajectory of 557 
technological change with a diffusion algorithm, which is calibrated on datasets of technology 558 
uptake in recent history (up to 2012 for power and transport, 2014 for heating) (Supplementary 559 
Tables 4 and 5). Each FTT model is based on a bottom-up description of heterogeneous 560 
agents who own or operate technologies that produce certain societal services (electricity 561 
generation, road transport, household heating), and who consider replacing such technologies 562 
according to lifetimes and contexts. As such, it is both a model of choice and one of technology 563 
vintage (or technology fleets). Replacement, or technological change, takes place at rates 564 
determined by the survival in time of technology units and/or the financing schedule. We 565 
assume that agents make comparisons between technology options that they individually see 566 
as available in their respective national markets, which we structure by pair-wise comparisons 567 
of distributed preferences. The model is a discrete choice model in which choice options are 568 
weighted by their own popularity, a method that generates endogenous S-shaped technology 569 
diffusion curves67. The technological trajectory is not based on economy-wide optimisation, 570 
but endogenously evolves from the sum of individual choices of heterogeneous agents with 571 
bounded rationality. FTT models are characterised by strong path-dependence of projected 572 
technology diffusion (equivalent to strong autocorrelation in time), as it is typically found in 573 
technology transitions68,69, and for that reason, provides a good representation of the inertia 574 
embedded in technological systems. It is thus well suited to analyse existing technological 575 
trajectories as observed in recent historical data. A description of how future demand for 576 
transport and heating is determined is given in Supplementary Section 2. Further descriptions 577 
of the individual FTT models can be found in refs.30,31,66,70–72. 578 
 579 
E3ME model. The FTT models are part of E3ME (hard-coupled within the same computer 580 
code), which represents in a top-down aggregate perspective relationships between 581 
macroeconomic quantities through a chosen set of econometric relationships that are 582 
regressed on the past 45 years of data and are projected 35 years into the future (until 2050). 583 
The macroeconomics in the model determine total demand and trade for manufactured 584 
products, services and energy carriers, output and employment for 43 economic sectors, 24 585 
fuel users and 12 fuels. The model is path-dependent, such that different policy scenarios 586 
generate different techno-economic and environmental trajectories that diverge from each 587 
other over time. Using the ‘what if’ mode of impact assessment, policies are chosen, and 588 
resulting outcomes can be projected. Meeting policy objectives (such as emissions targets) is 589 
not achieved by means of maximising or minimising some target function (such as welfare or 590 
costs). Instead, the model is run iteratively until the target would be met with a chosen set of 591 
policies. The model is regularly used in policy analyses and impact assessments for the 592 
European Commission and elsewhere73,74. See ref.27 for a detailed description of the 593 
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Fig. 1 Projections of global future technology diffusion in power generation, passenger road 
transport and household heating. Global technology mix in power generation (in PWh per year; a-
c), road transport by passenger cars (in trillion person kilometre per year; d-f), and residential space 
and water heating (in PWh thermal per year; g-i). Projections under the ‘current technological 
trajectory’ (left), the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (middle), and a scenario in which the 2°C policies are 
applied to transport and heating, but power generation follows its current trajectory (‘End-use without 
power policies’; right). Dashed lines show the total demand in the ‘current technological trajectory’ 
(a), for comparison. Relative to this trajectory, global electricity demand in 2050 is around 3% larger 




















Fig. 2 Boundary conditions for the use of electric cars and heat pumps. Conditions under which 
the life-cycle GHG emission intensities from (a) driving electric cars (EV) and (b) heating with electric 
heat pumps (HP) is currently lower compared to new petrol cars and fossil boilers being sold in the 
market, given different combinations of use-phase electricity demand and the electricity grid’s GHG 
emission intensity. Horizontal white lines indicate the average emission intensity of global electricity 
generation (in 2015), vertical dashed lines the estimates of average EV and HP use-phase 
efficiencies (in 2015). Boxes indicate the 90% range of EV use-phase efficiencies and the range of 
HP use-phase efficiencies (in 2015). (See Supplementary Information Fig. 2 and 3 for boundary 
conditions in 2030 and 2050 under different scenarios.)  






Fig. 3 GHG emission intensities of passenger cars. Current (in 2015; a) and projected (in 2030 
and 2050; b-e) GHG emission intensities (in gCO2eq per vehicle-kilometre) from driving battery 
electric cars, for the ten countries with the highest passenger car transport demand in 2015 (share 
in global demand equivalent to width of bars). Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ 
(b-c), the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (d-e), and the ‘end-use without power policies’ scenario (f-g). Height 
of vertical bars shows an average electric car’s estimated GHG emission intensity, given the power 
sector’s emission intensity in each country (results from this study). The range of the GHG emission 
intensity reflects higher and lower use-phase energy requirements of different available electric car 
models and sizes. For comparison, grey boxplots show the distribution of GHG emission intensities 
of newly sold fossil fuel cars in each country (mean, 50% and 90% ranges)29,30.  
 670 
 671 





Fig. 4 GHG emission intensities in household heating. Current (in 2015; a) and projected (in 2030 
and 2050; b-e) GHG emission intensities (in gCO2eq per kWh of heat) from heating with heat pumps, 
for the ten countries with the highest residential heat demand in 2015 (share in global demand 
equivalent to width of bars). Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ (b-c), the ‘2°C 
policy scenario’ (d-e) , and the ‘end-use without power policies’ scenario (f-g). Height of vertical bars 
shows an average heat pump’s estimated GHG emission intensity, given the power sector’s emission 
intensity in each country. The range of the GHG emission intensity reflects higher and lower 
conversion efficiencies of different heat pump models and operating conditions. For comparison, grey 
boxplots show the distribution of GHG emission intensities of newly sold fossil-based heating systems 







Fig. 5 Relative GHG emission intensities of electric cars and heat pumps around the world. 
World regions in which electric cars (a) / heat pumps (b) have lower projected life-cycle GHG 
emissions than new petrol cars / fossil boilers in almost all cases (‘green’) or on average (‘yellow’), 
or are more GHG emission intensive on average (‘red’). Projections for 2030 and 2050 (c-d) under 









Fig. 6 Changes in global GHG emissions from electric cars and heat pumps. Indirect GHG 
emissions from use-phase electricity generation (orange); compared to avoided direct GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion (dark purple) and indirect GHG emissions from fossil fuel 
production (light purple) that would result if the same demand would be fulfilled with average new 
fossil fuel-based cars and heating systems. The GHG emissions from producing cars and heating 
systems are shown in dark blue (battery production in light blue). Grey dots indicate the overall net 
change in global GHG emissions from using electric cars and heat pumps, respectively. Ranges 
around the median estimate illustrate the possible range of net changes under lower and higher 
average use-phase efficiencies of electric cars and heat pumps. Number in italics show the global 
market share of electric cars/heat pumps. Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ (a-
b), the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (c-d), and under a scenario in which the 2°C policies are applied to 
transport and heating, but power generation follows the ‘current technological trajectory’ (‘end-use 
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